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‘People live in poverty not because they are poor, but because they don’t have land to sustain 
their livelihoods.  We should not use this resource that we have in such abundance so as to 
create the same poverty for ourselves.’ 
Speaker Hon. Bukulu Edward Mandeson, Western Equatoria State Legislative Assembly 
 
Abstract 
Sudan is among the global ‘hotspots’ for large-scale land acquisitions. Although most of this 
investment activity was thought to be focused in the Northern part of the country, recent research 
indicates that a surprising number of large-scale land acquisitions have taken place in the South as 
well in recent years. Now that Southern Sudanese have opted for independence in the 2011 
referendum on self-determination, investment activity will likely increase further. This paper 
presents preliminary data concerning large-scale land acquisitions in two of the ‘Green Belt’ states 
of Southern Sudan: Central Equatoria and Western Equatoria. It explores the concept ‘land belongs 
to the community’, a statement that has been taken up by communities in their demand for 
greater involvement in decision-making regarding community lands. It also examines processes of 
company–community engagement and the extent to which rural communities are being involved in 
investment projects. Finally, the paper presents a number of case studies that illustrate the 
complex interplay between cultural sovereignty, conflict, and post-war reconstruction in Southern 
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1. Introduction  
Flying over Southern Sudan, its sheer size strikes one. Miles upon miles of lush, fertile land and untouched 
forest pass by underneath as the Nile River and its tributaries flow north. A few thatched-roof huts, or 
tukuls, dot the landscape but from 5 500m, they are almost indistinguishable from the surrounding 
grassland. At this height, it is easy to conclude that Southern Sudan is an undiscovered Eden just waiting to 
be brought into productive use. A grounded view depicts a far more complex reality.   
 
Southern Sudan is home to about 65 ethnic groups whose territories span the entire region (UNOCHA 
2009), almost none of which is no-man’s land. Virtually all land in the region is owned, in the sense that 
one or more communities retain the right to regulate its use under customary law (Rolandsen 2010: 5). 
Areas that appear unoccupied may in fact be designated for seasonal use by people and livestock. Many 
communities also practice shifting cultivation, and an area that looks like natural forest may actually be a 
field left fallow for a few years (sometimes up to a decade or more)  until it is ready to be planted again. 
 
Nonetheless, it is hard to shake the feeling that land in Southern Sudan is being under-used, particularly as 
widespread poverty and food insecurity pervade the region. According to the World Food Program (WFP) 
(2010), nine in ten people live on less than a dollar a day and 3.3 million people —  more than a third of the 
population — are moderately or severely food insecure; high levels of displacement contribute to the 
problem. In 2009 and 2010, inter-tribal fighting, attacks by the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and 
extensive flooding across several southern states displaced more than 600 000 people (IDMC 2010: 6). 
Rural infrastructure is almost nonexistent; until recently, there was only about 11km of paved road in all of 
Southern Sudan. 
 
Some see increased private investment in land and forests as a way to diversify the oil-dependent 
economy, enhance food security and stimulate rural development. Proponents of large-scale land 
acquisitions assert that by amassing large areas of unused land into large-scale mechanised farms, 
Southern Sudan can produce enough food to feed its population and export food to international markets.   
 
However, such claims deserve further scrutiny: when operating in a fragile post-conflict context such as 
Southern Sudan, transferring large areas of land to private individuals or businesses could undermine local 
land rights, accelerate concentrated land ownership and have unpredictable effects on conflict dynamics. 
Dispossessing communities of their homelands can increase competition between neighbouring 
communities over remaining natural resources, and with the proliferation of small arms in Southern Sudan, 
such competition is often violent. Yet, timidly accepting the status quo is not tenable: increasing food 
production and stimulating rural economies is becoming increasingly urgent and treating customary claims 
as sacrosanct runs the risk of continued suffering for local populations. The government’s task is not to 
insulate customary lands from the outside world, but rather to attract investment that: 
  builds constructive relationships between companies and host communities; and 
  prioritises the local population’s development needs. 
 
In this context (further explored in Section 2.1), we examine community participation in large-scale land 
investments, exploring the various loci of decision-making in Southern Sudanese land investments and the 
extent to which rural communities are involved in the process. The legal framework (discussed in Section 
2.2) is full of the ambiguities of post-conflict settings, but provides textual support for community land 
ownership — particularly in the 2009 Land Act. In demanding a more central role in decision-making about 
communal land, communities have taken up the principle that the ‘land belongs to the community’ (as 
analysed in Section 2.3). Preliminary data on several large-scale land acquisitions in two ‘Green Belt’ states 
— Central Equatoria and Western Equatoria — are highlighted in Section 3. The paper concludes with a 
number of practical considerations for the country to take into account moving forward. 
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2. Context 
African farmland has come under increasing pressure from commercial land-based investments in recent 
years. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that from 2007 to 2010, foreign interests 
acquired 20 million hectares of African land (Graham et al 2010: 5). Some analysts see opportunities in the 
trend, arguing that provided African states enact certain regulatory reforms, they can harness the surge in 
foreign investment to provide jobs and develop rural communities (Deininger et al 2011). Critics (e.g. 
Borras&Franco 2010: 515), however, have dubbed it the ‘global land grab’, asserting that: 
  The scale of land acquisitions could deny millions of land users' access to vital natural resources, 
undermine food security and exacerbate tenure insecurity.  
  Efforts to create a voluntary code of conduct ‘whitewash’ the problem and divert attention from 
alternative development pathways that may benefit rural populations more, e.g. improving 
smallholder farmers' productive capacity.  
  The global industrial food and energy complex deprives rural populations of land to provide cheap 
food and energy for the developed world. 
2.1 The politics of Sudan  
Sudan is a global ‘hotspots’ for large-scale land acquisitions (Cotula et al 2009: 17). According to a recent 
World Bank (2010: 44) study, from 2004 to 2009, Sudan transferred nearly 4 million hectares to private 
investors — more than any other country surveyed1. With the current unpredictable transitional period in 
Southern Sudan, investment activity was thought to be concentrated in the North, but a recent study 
(Deng 2011) shows several large-scale land investments in Southern Sudan in recent years. From January 
2007 to December 2010, foreign interests sought or acquired about 4.92 million hectares for agriculture, 
biofuel, carbon credit, forestry and ecotourism/ conservation projects — 7.6% of Southern Sudan’s total 
land area. In theory, investment influx could provide sorely needed development for the new nation, but 
the nascent state of government, a society still reeling from years of conflict, and the legal ambiguity of the 
current transition, create real danger that such investment could undermine livelihoods.   
Sudan and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
Sudan is the largest country in Africa, covering 2.5 million km2; Southern Sudan covers 640 000 km2. 
Besides hosting the world's longest river, the Nile, Sudan is home to the world's largest farm in Gezira 
irrigated cotton scheme and ‘the world’s largest sugar-producing complex’, the Kenana project (Ahmed 
2004: 138), but these projects in Northern Sudan little benefit the southern Sudanese — like other 
Northern investment projects2.   
 
Sudan spent most of its post-colonial history embroiled in civil war after the British handed power to a 
small Arab-Islamic elite at independence, perpetuating a pattern of state resources benefiting a privileged 
few in Khartoum at the expense of periphery populations (Cockett 2010). The second North–South civil 
war lasted from 1983 to 2005 — the longest running civil conflict of its time, with the southern-led Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) pitted against the northern National Congress Party 
(NCP)-controlled government in Khartoum. The south's sense of discrimination and marginalisation fuelled 
the rebellion. By the time peace was agreed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, about 
2.5 million people had died and 4 million people were displaced, some still in Sudan as internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) and others having taken refuge in other countries. 
                                                           
112.5 million hectares were already under private or government commercial lease before 2005 (Wily 2010a: 21). 
2 Government initially designed mechanised farming schemes in the 1970s to include 40–60% of local persons as beneficiaries, 
but according to Wily (2010a: 5), this practice quickly fell away, and ‘local communities found that thousands of hectares of 
their traditionally owned lands were taken by the Khartoum Administration and leased out to … northern businessmen, 
officials, politicians and foreign companies from the north, and from Egypt, Palestine and other foreign countries...'. 
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The CPA was based on a ‘one country, two systems’ model — giving the south self-determination and 
regional autonomy in the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). The GoSS president serves as vice-
president of the Republic of Sudan. SPLM/A, the main GoSS party, has representation in the newly created 
Government of National Unity (GoNU), controlled by the NCP in Khartoum. National elections held in April 
2010 were to create an opportunity for democratic transformation, but did not significantly alter the 
power balance. From 9–16 January 2011, Southern Sudan held a referendum to decide whether it would 
remain united with the north or secede and become an independent nation. Despite numerous delays in 
preparing for the vote and vitriolic rhetoric from officials on both sides, the referendum proceeded quite 
smoothly. As expected, the vote overwhelmingly favoured secession, but the situation remains very tense. 
 
A separate referendum scheduled for the disputed oil-rich border region, Abyei, has been postponed 
indefinitely. As southern voters took to the polls, clashes broke out between northern- and southern-
affiliated groups in Abyei, resulting in dozens of casualties. Violence along the border could still lead to a 
larger conflict; rebellion by high-level southern military leaders further complicate the situation. 
Meanwhile, a host of post-referendum issues remain unresolved — border demarcation, citizenship, 
sharing oil revenue, allocation of national debt — adding pressure to an already tense relationship. 
The private sector’s response 
The unpredictable situation has a ‘chilling effect’ on private sector investment: if war were to resume, any 
immoveable assets in the region, including land, would be extremely vulnerable. Investors who acquired 
land are mostly waiting to see the outcome of the referendum before devoting more resources to property 
development, so even when agreements exist, evidence of investment activity is not visible on the ground. 
However, the nascent state and the ambiguity of prevailing law also seem to encourage speculative 
investments. In some cases, powerbrokers have begun to acquire vast tracts of land to secure access to 
natural resources and be in position for any rising demand that would presumably accompany a stable, 
independent South Sudan. Such acquisitions usually include vague promises to invest money in property 
development, but they mainly seem to claim land and wait to see if land values rise. 
 
For example, a US investment firm — Jarch Management Group — ostensibly acquired land to implement 
a joint agricultural venture, but a Small Arms Survey (McEvoy&LeBrun 2010: 36) speculates that the firm is 
really interested in exploiting the area’s oil resources. This somewhat atypical investment involves a 
transaction between two private companies with no official government involvement. The Financial Times 
(Blas&Wallis 2009) and Rolling Stone Magazine (Funk 2010) and other media outlets, reported that Jarch 
leased about 400,000 hectares in Unity State by buying a majority share in a company owned by Gabriel 
Matip, son of SPLA deputy commander-in-chief Paulino Matip; more land is reportedly in negotiation.  
 
Jarch’s interest in Unity State predates the CPA: in 2004, it signed contracts with the South Sudan Defense 
Forces (SSDF), a Khartoum-allied militia led by Paulino Matip, to explore for oil in Unity State. At the time, 
the SSDF provided oilfields security in the area on behalf of the NCP. The peace deal changed the situation 
dramatically as Paulino Matip and the southern government signed the 2006 Juba Declaration, disbanding 
the SSDF and providing for its integration it into the SPLM/A; Paulino Matip was simultaneously promoted 
to deputy commander-in-chief. In May 2008, Jarch issued a press release indicating that they still expected 
to exploit natural resources in Unity State, despite the national government refusing to recognise the 
firm’s contract with SSDF. The press release proclaimed that Jarch expected ‘to lift the light, sweet crude 
from areas in [Unity] state once South Sudan secedes from Khartoum’. The firm also planned to mine 
minerals — including uranium deposits, in the area (JMG 2008). Just six months later, Jarch made the 
agreement with Gabriel Matip for the joint agricultural venture.  
 
Despite media attention devoted to this investment, the lease between Heilberg and Matip seems to be 
nothing more than agreement between two companies, neither of which seems to be the legal landowner. 
The new GoSS policy is that ‘land belongs to the community,’ and an individual company should not be 
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able to unilaterally claim ownership over such a large area of community land. Chairperson of the Southern 
Sudan Land Commission Robert Lado emphasised this point in an interview with Reuters (Wheeler 2009):  
Our land is communal in Southern Sudan. An individual can only sell it when there is consensus 
among members of that community … Even if he is leasing this land on behalf of his family, there are 
other members of the family. Even if on behalf of his clan, there are other members of the clan. 
The Mayom County Commissioner where the land acquisition supposedly took place has never  heard of 
Jarch Management, yet prevailing practice regarding land allotments requires that proposed investment be 
surveyed and registered with state authorities prior to transfer, which could not proceed without the 
county commissioner knowing, nor is there any sign of investment activity on the ground. Jarch 
Management CEO Phil Heilberg’s statements indicate that he is relying more on the influence of military3 
business partners than on the legality of the acquisition process to guarantee his investment. However, 
until Jarch secures official government backing, it is difficult to see how the investment could proceed. The 
Unity State governor expressed scepticism about the validity of the deal but also said the government 
would be open to Jarch investing in Unity if the company followed proper procedures. The difficulty of 
discerning fact from fiction in this investment reflects the lack of transparency associated with large-scale 
land acquisitions in Southern Sudan more generally. 
The GoSS’s approach to large-scale land acquisitions 
Before war broke out in 1983, Sudan had a reputation internationally as a model of Afro-Arab unity. 
Supported by loans from the World Bank, the government embarked on ambitious large-scale irrigation 
projects and encouraged private investment in mechanised agriculture. With its large tracts of fertile land, 
Sudan was promoted as a potential ‘breadbasket’ of the Arab world (Kaikati 1980). Despite massive 
investments, extreme food shortages and famines still plagued the country in the 1970s, 80s and 90s 
(Ahmed 2004:139). From the mid-90s until the early 2000s the war in the south intensified and agricultural 
production stagnated, while from 1999 the Sudanese economy became increasingly dependent on oil 
exports to the detriment of other sectors. According to the World Bank (2009: 10), between 2000 and 2008 
the agricultural sector only grew annually by 3.6%, a fraction of the 1990s 10.8% growth rate. Despite the 
lacklustre performance of past agricultural policies, the ‘breadbasket’ rhetoric of the 1970s and 80s has 
resurfaced. In an October 2010 address, President of Southern Sudan Salva Kiir (2010) declared his 
government’s ambitious plans to increase agricultural production: 
I urge investors worldwide to come and invest in Southern Sudan. In terms of agriculture, it will be 
the breadbasket of the region and the world. 
Policy statements from GoSS Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry suggest it also sees large-scale land 
acquisitions as a prominent driver of private investment in Southern Sudan. The Food and Agriculture 
Policy Framework (GoSS 2006) advises ‘the Government should quickly start ... allotting large plots of 
uninhabited farmland to private investors for commercial agriculture’. Policy analyst Paul De Wit (2008: 13) 
who studied the link between land and conflict in Southern Sudan, warns that the acquisition of large land 
areas by private investors may serve to marginalise customary rights: 
[T]he new Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry turned into a de facto player, albeit in the more 
traditional role of promoting activities such as the allocation of big areas for private investment 
without too much consultation. This complicates rather than resolves deep-rooted problems. A 
strongly renewed emphasis on the promotion of private, including foreign investment in the 
agricultural sector represents a clear shift from a community rights-based to a private sector 
                                                           
3 According to Sudan Tribune (2010), Jarch’s advisory board includes Paulino Matip and former Khartoum-backed militia 
leader Gabriel Tanginye. Heilberg also said Jarch has ‘close ties’ with Peter Gadet, who at various times fought for and 
against the SPLM/A. 
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investment-based approach, with the role of local communities and their legitimate rights over land 
once again becoming secondary. 
Government support for large-scale land acquisitions is apparently premised on the idea that large areas of 
unused land exist in Southern Sudan, and that bringing these areas into productive use can help meet the 
challenge of feeding the population. From this perspective, one could argue that large-scale land 
acquisitions are viable in Southern Sudan, given the region’s size and low population density. However, 
while plantation farming may lower costs, it can have undesirable social and environmental consequences, 
often bourn disproportionately by host communities (Deininger et al 2011), and local employment 
opportunities generated often do not compensate for land-based livelihood loss resulting from 
dispossession (Vermeulen&Cotula 2010: 87). Large-scale land investments are also susceptible to elite 
capture and risk centralising development benefits in a similar way to the Gezira scheme and Kenana 
project in Khartoum. Critics already accuse the GoSS of devoting too many resources to ministries in Juba 
while neglecting local administrations in the ten states, leading at least one author to question whether 
Juba will turn into a ‘one-city state’ like Khartoum in the North (Cockett 2010). Concentrating land in the 
private sector is likely to exacerbate uneven and inequitable development patterns in the region. 
Alternatives to the large-scale land acquisition model 
At international level, human rights advocates, farmers' movements and agrarian reform activists promote 
alternative approaches to large-scale commercial farming operations. United Nations Special Rapporteur 
on the Right to Food Olivier De Schutter (2009:8) counsels governments and investors to first consider 
models that take advantage of existing smallholder farmer networks before transferring large portions of 
land to investors for commercial farming:  
[I]nvestors should be encouraged to establish and promote farming systems that are labour-intensive 
rather than focused on achieving the highest productivity per hectare. This requirement will ensure 
that investment agreements contribute to the fullest extent possible to reinforcing local livelihood 
options and in particular provide access to a living wage for the local population involved.  
The International Institute of the Environment and Development (Vermeulen&Cotula 2010) also promotes 
inclusive business models that seek to build collaborative partnerships between smallholders and the 
private sector. It advises that various forms of contract farming, joint ventures and models maximising up- 
and downstream business links may be preferable to more centralised large-scale land acquisitions. 
 
Despite the advantages of alternative business models, investment projects seeking to work with 
smallholder farmers would face several challenges in Southern Sudan, as farming cooperatives are virtually 
non-existent. Investors may be wary to invest in the underdeveloped and poorly organised organisations 
that do exist, particularly if they have to carry the initial risk of providing agricultural inputs before realising 
a return at harvest time. The legacy of food aid in Southern Sudan has also created a sense of entitlement 
among some local producers.  By virtue of their dealings with the United Nations and various International 
NGOs, local people sometimes see outside assistance as a right, not a business relationship where both 
sides are obliged to meet their promises. Rural labour productivity also often quite low, as young people 
prefer to pursue education and employment opportunities in towns rather than commit to the  'drudgery' 
associated with farm work. War has left a traumatised population in Southern Sudan and individuals willing 
to work on farms may be less productive than their counterparts elsewhere. Such obstacles, while 
surmountable, increase investor risk and may cause them to gravitate towards more centralised large-scale 
land acquisitions. 
 
Southern Sudan is too large and diverse a region to propose a one-size-fits all solution to agricultural 
development. The region’s size and low population density may allow for some large-scale mechanised 
production, but by placing too much emphasis on commercial farming the GoSS may miss agricultural 
development opportunities that will produce more benefits for locals. 
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2.2 The ambiguous post-CPA legal framework 
Post-independence, national land legislation based on the colonial model strongly favoured state land 
ownership. Anglo-Egyptian colonial administrators created laws based on a rebuttable presumption that 
government owned unregistered land. The 1905 Land Settlement Ordinance (LSO) and 1925 Land 
Settlement and Registration Ordinance (LSRO) stipulated that ‘waste, forest, and unoccupied land shall be 
deemed to be the property of the government, until the contrary is proved’ (LSO: 7(ii); LSRO: 16(c)).   
 
In 1970, the Nimeiri regime took state ownership a step further with the Unregistered Land Act (ULA), 
declaring all unregistered land of any kind, occupied or unoccupied, to be state property, deemed to be 
registered in the name of the state (ULA: 4(1)). Since virtually no community land was registered in 
Kartoum’s central lands registry, the ULA effectively eliminated any legal claims communities may have 
had to community lands (Kon Bior et al n.d.). As the FoodFirst Information Action Network (FIAN) (2000: 
12) described it, ‘In a single legislative act, the Sudan Government took legal hold of all smallholders’ land 
throughout Sudan.’ Although the ULA was formally repealed, subsequent legislation reaffirmed state 
ownership of unregistered land4.  
 
Such laws enabled the state to dispossess rural communities of their homelands at will. In Nuba 
Mountains, Southern Kordofan state along the north–south border, displacement was particularly with 
community land seized to establish large-scale mechanised farms (De Wit 2004: 4). According to Wily 
(2010a: 5) by 1990 in Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile the state had allocated 10 million hectares 
to local elites and investors and 5.5 million hectares to non-local investors for mechanised farming, 
resulting in forced evictions, displacement, loss of livelihoods, and outmigration to Khartoum and Southern 
Sudan. Destabilisation contributed to conflict in the south, as the SPLM/A found new allies among the 
Nuba of Southern Kordofan and Ingessana of Southern Blue Nile, as African Rights (1995: 48) chronicled: 
Nuba farmers resisted the merchant farmers and their tractors. Many burned the barrels of diesel, others 
threatened the labourers. Ultimately, many turned to the SPLM/A. 
 
For its part, the SPLM/A rejected northern laws in areas under its control and handled all matters 
according to customary law (Kuol 1997). When the GoSS was established in 2005, there was initially some 
question about the status of northern laws. An opinion letter circulated by the Ministry of Legal Affairs and 
Constitutional Development (MOLACD) (2006b) indicated that the GoSS would recognise all non-shari’a 
national laws in Southern Sudan. According to the letter:  
The application of the National Laws in the former Government of Sudan held areas and the 
application of New Sudan laws in the former SPLM/A held areas created a massive confusion, 
uncertainty, and lack of confidence in the law enforcement agencies and the administrator of justice 
in Southern Sudan.   
The circular intended to address confusion and uncertainty, and build confidence in Southern Sudanese 
law enforcement agencies, but instead caused a stir, as it seemed to imply that national laws like the ULA 
would be given effect in the liberated south. A month later MOLACD (2006a) clarified its position in a 
second opinion letter, stating that ‘pending the enactment of a Southern Sudan land law’ non-shari’a 
based national laws ‘with the exception of land laws such as the Unregistered Land Act, 1970’ would be 
given force in Southern Sudan. Although it was still unclear exactly which national laws would be given 
effect, the August opinion letter did render Southern Sudan’s interim land laws more consistent with the 
CPA and Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (ICSS), but did not completely resolve legal ambiguities. 
While the GoSS rejected national laws that put all land in state hands, southern land administration 
institutions still used processes based, to varying degrees, on pre-CPA northern law.  
                                                           
4 The 1984 Civil Transactions Act, which repealed the ULA, reaffirmed government ownership of unregistered land (Bruce 
1998). 
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While this question is still unresolved, people are returning south, the region is developing and investors 
are flocking to access new opportunities. But ambiguity on fundamental issues (like land ownership and 
jurisdictional boundaries) between the GoSS and the state create complications for southern land 
administration systems. Minister of Legal Affairs John Luk noted the implications for potential investors:  
We are being swarmed by a lot of people who want to invest. And they are curious about what they 
read in the [Comprehensive Peace] agreement, which says that land belongs to the communities. 
Now, as a government of South Sudan, how do we respond? 
Source: Deng 2010: 202 
Seeking to address legal uncertainty and provide a legal foundation for ideas espoused in the CPA and ICSS, 
the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly passed three key pieces of legislation in 2009: the Land Act, the 
Local Government Act (LGA), and the Investment Promotion Act. The Land Act (2009: ch II, 8(6)) reinforces 
government recognition of customary land tenure: ‘Customary land rights including those held in common 
shall have equal force and effect in law with freehold or leasehold rights.’ Community land can be allocated 
to investors as long as investment activity ‘reflect[s] an important interest for the community’ and 
‘contribute[s] economically and socially to the development of the local community’ (ch. IX, 63(1)–(2)).  It 
also requires that state authorities approve land acquisitions above 250 feddans (105 hectares) and create 
a regulated ceiling on land allocations. 
 
Both the Land Act (ch. IX, 63(3)) and the LGA (2009: ch. IX, § 89) require government to consult local 
communities and consider their views in decisions about community land. The Land Act (2009: ch X 67) 
gives pastoralists special protection: ‘[N]o person shall without permission … carry out any activity on the 
communal grazing land which may prevent or restrict the residents of the traditional communities 
concerned from exercising their grazing rights’. Project proponents must also conduct environmental and 
social impact assessments (ESIAs) before undertaking any activity that might affect people or the 
environment (ch. XI, 70(3)). When an investment is complete, leased land ‘shall revert back to the 
community’ (ch. VI, 27(7)).   
 
Though the Land Act (ch. IV, 14),  allows long-term leases up to 99 years, the Investment Promotion Act 
explicitly limits foreign investments in agriculture and forestry to renewable terms of 30 and 60 years, 
respectively (Second Schedule (3)). As leases constitute investment property and can therefore be 
considered investments in their own right, any agricultural lease longer than 30 years and any forestry 
lease longer than 60 years would be inconsistent with the provisions of the Investment Promotion Act. Due 
to the poor uptake of these laws, however, many government institutions are unaware of the restriction 
and 99-year leases for foreign investments in agriculture and forestry are fairly common. 
 
Although, in theory, these statutes protect rural communities from unilaterally imposed land acquisitions, 
they have poor exposure even in institutions of government. Efforts to put provisions into practice are 
likely to encounter several obstacles: 
  Land registries dating back to colonial times exist in a few Southern Sudanese towns, but they are 
hopelessly backlogged and unable to cope with the increased demand for land. 
  Government officials tightly control access to information in the registries, which sometimes does 
not correspond with existing property arrangements. 
  Even if state governments are able to expedite the survey and demarcate landholdings for transfer 
to foreign and domestic investors, drawing boundaries on such large areas is likely to create border 
disputes with neighbouring communities. 
  In some cases, investors are acquiring land before it has even been registered as community land. 
Many long-term investments are already in danger of becoming full alienations of the land, and the 
lack of registration prior to transfer further endangers communities’ reversionary interests.   
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Government methods for deciding the boundaries of community land are still undefined. If one accepts 
that no-man’s land does not exist in Southern Sudan, the definition of community land based on 
communities’ own understanding of their territorial boundaries would result in communities owning 
virtually the entire region with the same rights as individuals who have freehold title. If, on the other hand, 
the government extended formal customary rights only to lands that community members occupy and use 
on a regular basis, it would result in much smaller communal landholdings. Hence, even though the Land 
Act made strides to recognise community land ownership, government must still resolve many issues 
before communities can rely on legal protections. Meanwhile, communities must rely on broad aspirations 
in support of customary land tenure in the CPA and ICSS to justify a more prominent role in decision-
making about investments on community land.  
2.3 ‘Land belongs to the community’ 
A strong theme of community participation permeates all Southern Sudan’s land issues, based on the 
principle ‘land belongs to the community’ — a statement intended to convey the idea that communities 
should be the primary decision-makers about land in their communities. The idea has played a central role 
in shaping public opinion about relationships between the ‘state’ and the ‘community’ on the issue of land. 
Given the origin of the idea, its legal basis is unresolved, but the idea is being used in ways that resemble a 
consent-based standard. 
The constitutional pedigree of ‘land belongs to the community’ 
The phrase ‘land belongs to the community’ can be traced to public statements of the late SPLM/A leader 
Dr John Garang who, throughout the 22-year civil war, used it to rally support for the SPLM/A. As peace 
talks that eventually culminated in the CPA got underway in Naivasha, Kenya, ‘land belongs to the 
community’ was a key component of SPLM/A’s negotiating posture. By asserting community ownership of 
land, the SPLM/A set itself in direct opposition to state-centric land ownership policies of the northern 
government. In addition to its popular appeal in Southern Sudan, community land ownership also served 
as a means to impede the northern government’s claim to natural resources in the south.   
 
Perhaps because of high-profile support, the Southern Sudanese commonly held the misperception that 
the CPA and interim constitutions enshrined the principle. Though the texts strongly favour community 
participation in land issues and the right of communities to share wealth created by land investments, they 
do not explicitly provide for community land ownership. In fact, the CPA wealth sharing protocol (ch. III, 
2.1) clearly states that the agreement is not intended to address land ownership.  
 
Despite lacking a textual basis for the assertion, many communities continue to demand a central role in 
decision-making about community land. Administrators complain that communities are trying to claim 
back land previously been designated for urban development, impeding the orderly expansion of several 
southern towns. Communities are also place high demands on government access to community land for 
investment. Such opposition can be traced back to misappropriation of community land in the 
administrative confusion when the GoSS was established in 2005, which fuelled local level mistrust of the 
GoSS. Therefore, some communities are reluctant to provide land for government-led investment projects.   
 
While it is true that the phrase ‘land belongs to the community’ does not appear in the CPA or the ICSS, 
several factors lend support to placing the central locus of decision-making about land in the communities: 
According to the CPA and ICSS, land administration should be a concurrent competence, regulated at a 
suitable level of government (ch. III,2.3; ICSS, pt. 12, ch. 2, 180(1)). When conflict arises ‘subsidiarity’ (in 
practice devolution to the lowest level) must be considered in deciding which level of government shall be 
in charge of a particular issue (CPA, pt. 5, Schedule F), suggesting that land administration systems should 
be embedded primarily at the local level, with the GoSS role limited to providing uniformity and general 
policy guidelines. 
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The focus on the text of the CPA and the ICSS overlooks the fact that community ownership of land can be 
inferred from the formalisation of customary law. A fundamental principle of many Southern Sudanese 
customary land tenure systems is that land is owned by the community in its collective capacity and that 
decisions about land must reached through consensus decision-making processes in the community. Full 
recognition of customary law would thus presumably empower communities with a central role in 
decision-making processes.  
 
Arguments in favour of community land ownership were taken up by the Southern Sudan Land 
Commission (SSLC) in developing Southern Sudan’s first regional land policy. In February 2011, after a 
lengthy consultative process that involved a series of workshops in each of the ten states, the SSLC and its 
international partners formally handed over a draft land policy to the GoSS Ministry of Legal Affairs. The 
draft land policy seeks to articulate the broad goals of land administration in Southern Sudan moving into 
post-referendum period. It emphasises access to land as a ‘social right’, a feature of customary land tenure 
systems that allows community members to access land irrespective of wealth or economic status. The 
draft policy also specifically identifies risks associated with ‘land grabbing’, which it defines as ‘the 
acquisition of land without regard for the interests of existing land rights holders’. It argues: 
In some jurisdictions, community land used in common — for forest products, grazing and water 
supply — has been alienated by central and state level authorities for public use or for sale or lease 
to private investors without taking account of the ownership interests of communities in the land and 
its associated natural resources. This has occurred despite the fact that historically and customarily 
communal land has fallen under the ownership of communities, and its use has been regulated by 
traditional or other community-level authorities. 
The policy statement makes clear that land ownership is vested in communities and communities, not 
government, should be the primary parties that enter into agreements with investors (SSLC 2011: 22): 
Although the draft policy must still pass through the council of ministers and legislative assembly before it 
comes into force, the policy prescriptions show continued support for community land ownership in some 
sectors of society. However, despite the normative influence of the ‘land belongs to the community’ 
principle, many rural communities are still sidelined in decision-making concerning community land 
allocation to investor. Southern Sudanese communities routinely complain that government allocates land 
to companies without consulting them. When companies become more active and host communities begin 
to feel the impact of their presence more acutely, demands for local involvement are likely to increase, 
which would test the normative influence of ‘land belongs to the community’.  A member of an agricultural 
development committee in Unity State commented:  
Let me give some advice to these companies. Please don’t start from the government and come 
down to the community. You are starting another war. And it will be more serious than the one with 
the Arabs. 
Community consent in practice 
With the greater requirements of ‘land belongs to the community’, large-scale land investments in many 
southern areas are not viable in the face of strong community opposition. Community consent may even 
be demanded for investment on state land. For example, in 2007, GoSS agreed to a 32-year lease for 
Equatoria Teak Company (in which the British and Finnish governments are primary shareholders) to 
harvest teak in 18,640 hectares of government-owned forest reserves in Nzara County, Western Equatoria 
State (WES). According to the Paramount Chief in Nzara County (pers. comm. 2010), GoSS and Equatoria 
Teak agreed on the concession without involving state government or local communities. The community 
objected, asserting that since ‘land belongs to the community’ the investment could not proceed without 
involving them, even though the concession agreement made provision for a social fund to finance 
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development projects in affected communities5. Local opposition resulted in the WES legislative assembly 
holding hearings on the matter and the company undertook stakeholder engagement to inform the 
community about their plans and benefits to the community.   
 
WES has since incorporated the procedural innovation into its land acquisition process; large-scale land 
acquisitions now require, before finalisation, approval from the legislative assembly and the council of 
ministers. If consistently applied, such requirements should help to foster transparent and accountable 
investment projects, but without a coherent national policy detailing procedural requirements, regulatory 
variation could spur a race to the bottom as states compete to attract investors. For example, an Indian 
company, the MAJ Foundation, put efforts to obtain a forest concession in WES on hold instead pursuing 
an agreement in Western Bahr-el-Ghazal State where regulations are more lax. By setting base regulatory 
standards, the GoSS could discourage states from proceeding with potentially harmful deregulation in an 
effort to attract investment. Of course, such regulatory standards must be flexible enough to allow for 
experimentation like that which led WES to adopt its new procedural requirements in the first place. 
 
In Southern Sudan, some degree of consultation and consent is typically deemed necessary, even for 
projects on government-owned land, but consultation processes are poorly defined, and consultations 
rarely take place before government negotiates investment agreements. Consultation is often seen as a 
formality, undertaken only after the government and investor have reached an understanding on 
important elements of the investment. Of the ten agricultural and forestry investments surveyed in this 
study, only two conducted community consultations before finalising the investment agreement. Some 
communities demand consultation when the company undertakes particularly visible activities, but 
negotiating parties rarely provide for more systematic community participation in investment decision-
making. Such shortcomings may be attributable to lesser normative standards or may instead reflect the 
fact that communities are often forced to settle for whatever level of participation they can to secure for 
themselves. With government currently unable to provide services in much of the region, benefits 
promised by investors are one the few sources of development available to rural communities so they tend 
to be reluctant to turn investors away, even if investment benefits are sharply skewed in favour of the 
investor. Yet, as the Equatoria Teak case shows, if government and investors ignore affected communities 
or fail to get their consent, communities have proven remarkably effective at impeding investment plans 
and forcing the parties to acknowledge them. 
 
3. Large#scale land investment in Southern Sudan 
This section provides an overview of large-scale land investments planned or underway in two states in 
Southern Sudan: Western Equatoria State (WES) and Central Equatoria State (CES). WES and CES comprise 
two of the three ‘Green Belt’ states in Southern Sudan6. Due to fertile soils, high rainfall and abundant 
forests in these states, they are likely to be central locations of agricultural and forestry investment as the 
region develops. Due to legal ambiguity during the transition no uniform procedure for managing large-
scale land acquisitions currently exists. Various levels of government manage applications using ad hoc 
procedures, so many deals lack transparency and accountability and comprehensive data is not available. 
Preliminary data (see Table 1) were collected from government institutions at GoSS and state-level, 
community leaders, and where possible, investment companies7.
                                                           
5 Equatoria Teak deposited £123 908 in a social fund and is meant to deposit another £6.20 for every cubic meter of sawn 
board exported. It also made a £185 861 refundable deposit to government and pays government £61.95 royalties for every 
cubic meter of sawn board exported. WES Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry officials complain that these figures grossly 
undervalue the teak. 
6 Eastern Equatoria State is the third ‘Green Belt’ state.   
7 For a comprehensive listing of investments in Southern Sudan, see Deng (2011). 
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Table 1: Preliminary data on large-scale land investments CES and WES 
 Company Nationality Sector Size (ha) Location 
(county) 









Development Assistance for 
Southern Sudan (CEDASS) 
Canadian  Agriculture (sorghum) 12,180 (trial planting 
underway on 105) 
Juba Government No acquisition 
involved 
Finalised 
Madhvani Group Ugandan Agriculture (sugar) TBD Terekeka/ 
Juba 
Government TBD MOU* 
Nile Trading and Development American Agriculture, forestry& 
biofuels 
600,000 (&right to 
extend to 1,000,000) 
Lainya Community 49 Finalised 
Central Equatoria Teak 
Company 
British/ Finnish Forestry (teak) 1,845 (&50,000 natural 
forest) 
Lainya Government / 
Community 
32 Finalised 
Green Resources Norwegian Forestry timber, carbon 
credit, conservation) 






Eyat Oilfield Services Northern Sudan Agriculture (fruit) 161,874 Ezo/ Tambura Community 99  MOU 







24,281 Yambio Community 32 MOU 
Blue Lakes Limited Kenyan Forestry (teak) 562 Yambio Government 30 Finalised 
Comde Teak Indian Forestry (teak) 8,015 Nzara / Ezo Government 32 Awaiting final 
authorisation 
Equatoria Teak Company British / Finnish Forestry (teak) 18,640 Nzara Government 32 Finalised 
*Note: MOU= Memorandum of Understanding; TBD= To be determined 
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The investments implicate a surprisingly large area; even excluding the Madhvani deal where government 
has not yet determined the size of the land parcel, the ten land deals in Table 1 cover nearly 1.5 million 
hectares in these two states alone. Such large investor interest is alarming given the uncertain transitional 
context. Forestry investments are also significantly more developed than agricultural investments, perhaps 
partly due to the illicit timber trade the NCP and SPLM/A conducted during the war. As a parliamentarian 
in the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly explained in an interview (Ashamu 2010: 18):  
Elsewhere, there were blood diamonds. For the North, there was blood petroleum — GoS 
[Government of Sudan] was drilling in the South to purchase weapons from Korea, China, Iraq and 
the Soviet Union. For us [in the SPLM/A], there was blood teak. 
Based on these experiences, the GoSS was already familiar with many aspects of timber extraction and 
could start harvesting forest reserves immediately upon assuming power. Agricultural investment, by 
contrast, often requires several years of financial input before it produces commercially viable yields.  
 
Community involvement in the investments is seriously deficient; several investments are in highly 
populated areas where thousands or even tens of thousands of people rely on the land for basic 
livelihoods. However, in only two of the ten investments were communities consulted before the parties 
negotiated the investment agreement. In the other eight investments, consultations were held (or are 
planned to be held) only after agreement, simply to notify the community about what to expect with no 
opportunity to influence the investment design in any substantial way. Similarly, no company undertook an 
ESIA before finalising the investment agreement. Three companies conducted an ESIA after starting 
operations and others reportedly planned to do so in soon, but no investors evidence shared decision-
making associated with robust community engagement. 
 
Finally, leases periods on government-owned land are shorter than those involving community land, 
reflecting government’s stronger negotiating power when brokering deals for government land, compared 
to the lesser negotiating power communities may have in brokering deals on community land. Although 
government institutions are typically also involved in negotiating deals on community land, the incentive to 
protect communities’ reversionary interests is limited since the government’s involvement with the 
investment would theoretically end when the land reverts back to the community. The two case studies 
below explore investment projects in more detail.  
3.1 The Madhvani Group  
Madhvani Group, a Ugandan conglomerate, and the GoSS have preliminary negotiations GoSS over a 
proposed sugar plantation and processing facility in Mangala payam8, on the Nile River about 70 km north 
of Juba. The group is one of the largest companies in Uganda — at one time accounting for 10% of 
Uganda’s gross domestic product (GDP) (Madhvani 2010). It operates in various sectors, from agriculture 
and agro-processing to media and information technology.   
Madhvani and the GoSS Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry have signed a MOU to establish the 
plantation; the group is now pursuing an MOU with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry for the 
processing facility. The MOUs are the first steps in a process planned to culminate in a transfer of leasehold 
rights to the company. According to the Undersecretary in the Ministry of Agriculture, the parties have not 
yet discussed lease terms in detail, so information about the implicated land, the lease period, and what 
will be given in exchange for the land is not yet available. 
 
The government’s land claim in the area is questionable as, according to the GoSS land owned by the 
northern government prior to the CPA passed to the GoSS when it assumed power in 2005. However, some 
argue that the Khartoum government never lawfully owned the land in the first place; a growing body of 
jurisprudence maintains that customary claims cannot be extinguished by statutory decree alone (Wily 
                                                           
8 A payam is the equivalent of an administrative district. 
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2010b: 14), but only by procedures that comply with basic standards of due process, e.g. registering 
community land under freehold title or expropriation (with fair compensation) for a public purpose. When 
the Khartoum government passed the Unregistered Land Act in 1970, decreeing all unregistered land to be 
government property, it did not compensate communities. Therefore, some argue that since the original 
taking was not lawful, the GoSS’s claims to these lands are similarly invalid. As many communities 
reoccupied this land during the war, the government’s claim to the land is all the more tenuous.   
 
The case study also sheds light on how the complex conflict dynamics in Southern Sudan inextricably 
intertwined with land claims. When investments are proposed in such environments, they risk feeding into 
conflict by contributing to power imbalances among various groups. Lastly, the case study illustrates how 
affected groups at the local level can be marginalised in decision-making about investments. Despite the 
normative influence of the ‘land belongs to the community principle’, such allocations of land without prior 
consultation are all too common in Southern Sudan. 
 
The proposed investment in Mangala is part of a broader GoSS initiative to revive old agro-industrial 
complexes across the south, establishing public-private partnerships with companies like the Madhvani 
Group. The Mangala factory dates back to the mid-1970s, when the Khartoum government started 
constructing an agro-industrial complex in the area. For a while, before the outbreak of war in 1983, the 
factory produced various products, including pasteurised dairy products, canned fish and sugar (sugarcane 
was sourced from a nearby plantation). When war reached Mangala in 1985, the factory and plantation 
were abandoned and the local community later established residences in the area where the plantation 
once stood. Despite the community’s land occupation throughout the civil war and continuing into the 
current post-conflict period, government asserts that land ownership passed to the GoSS when it took over 
southern administration from the Khartoum government in 2005. The community, however, maintains 
that the land belongs to them. 
 
While the government and the company seem committed to finalising the land acquisition, investment is 
currently on hold due to several overlapping crises in Mangala., including a border dispute between Juba 
and Terekeka County authorities over which county owns the land in question. Two administrations 
currently operate in the area, often referred to as Mangala-Juba and Mangala-Terekeka. According to 
Anthony Leju, a field officer with UNOCHA, when the administration of Mangala-Juba tried to erect a 
signpost for a police station that identified the area as part of Juba County, it provoked physical 
confrontations between the Bari and Mundari communities who live in the area, so several Bari 
households were displaced to villages further south. These events transpired during the election season of 
2010, and since then the dispute has become heavily politicised. The CES Governor reportedly petitioned 
the GoSS to step in to resolve the matter, however the GoSS declined to get involved, stating that as it was 
a state issue, state authorities should handle the matter. 
 
This dispute caused much political tension in CES, reflecting deteriorating relations between the Bari and 
the Mundari groups, whose traditional homelands are found in Juba and Terekeka respectively. In addition 
to the border dispute, several recent local conflicts have centred on Mangala . When displaced Dinka Bor 
communities moved through Mundariland with their cattle, conflicts began to flare up, instigated by acts 
of cattle raiding and perpetuated various underlying historical grievances. According to the UN OCHA 
(2010), 4 179 people were displaced by these conflicts in Mangala and Gemeiza, the payam in northern 
Mangala. Many residents sought refuge on islands in the Nile and fear to return home due to the prevailing 
insecurity. If the investment moves ahead as planned and the local community is permanently displaced 
from the land being leased by the company, it could further undermine livelihoods, already severely 
affected by conflict-related displacement. 
 
Judging by the way the project has progressed thus far, it seems unlikely that the local community will play 
a meaningful role in negotiating the investment agreement. Area paramount chief Sultan Abut Ladu had 
only minimal interaction with representatives of the Madhvani Group, who only visited the site twice after 
2007. He said several ‘Indians’ came to Mangala in 2007 asking to be shown where the sugar plantation 
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and processing facility once stood. The chief did not know they represented the Madhvani Group, but they 
took several soil samples and told him that they wanted to lease a large piece of land in the area. When 
the chief asked what would happen to people living on the land, they reportedly him they would have to 
move. According to the chief, no representatives of the Madhvani Group or government officials have 
returned to the area to discuss their investment plans after the initial interaction. 
 
Poor community involvement may be linked to government asserting ownership of the land in question. In 
negotiating deals for government land, officials may feel entitled to forgo community consultation until the 
investment reaches a stage where local community cooperation is necessary. Indeed, according to a GoSS 
Ministry of Agriculture official, the Ministry is unlikely to consider consultation or compensation until it 
clearly needs to relocate people. While this approach may save the GoSS and Madhvani from some ex ante 
transaction costs that could arise from three-way negotiation, it also sets the stage for more serious 
obstacles later. The community is already disillusioned with government due to clashes with the SPLM/A; 
by waiting to the end of negotiations to bring the community into the picture, the government risks further 
entrenching resentment. Tensions between the Bari and Mundari groups in the area add to the complexity 
of the situation, so the GoSS and the Madhvani Group would have to proceed carefully in defining affected 
groups for community engagement to avoid increased conflict. 
 
Despite minimal interactions with representatives of the Madhvani Group, the paramount chief claims his 
community would welcome the investment project, but also notes that they would reject outright 
arrangements such as 99-year leases or transferring title deeds to the company with no compensation. If 
the government and company had allowed for more robust community involvement, it could have helped 
ensure the investment is designed in a way that addresses these concerns. Indeed, good relations between 
the investor and host community will be indispensible for a successful investment. Aside from insecurity in 
the area, land use patterns in Mangala are likely to conflict with an agricultural project on this scale. The 
Mangala community  traditionally follows an agro-pastoralist lifestyle, so residents need access to large 
cattle grazing areas. Such land use would directly compete with a sugar plantation for land and water 
resources. Sustained community engagement could help to address such challenges and find ways to 
reduce social and economic risks associated with the investment. 
3.2 Green Resources 
A Norwegian company, Green Resources SA, is pursuing a 99-year lease for 179 000 hectares of land in CES 
to establish a tree plantation, forest conservation project, and carbon credit scheme. The company — 
created in 1995 — owns plantations in Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda. The Southern Sudan project, 
being implemented by a wholly owned subsidiary of Green Resources called TreeFarms Sudan, would 
cover most of Tindilo payam, Terekeka County. Green Resources first came to Southern Sudan in 2007, and 
as of September 2010, the company had spent more than two years pursuing its lease. At the time of 
writing, the investment agreement was with the CES Governor, awaiting final approval. Green Resource 
has meanwhile begun trial planting of 250 hectares of teak, mahogany and eucalyptus in Tindilo. 
 
Despite strides made in creating a system that recognises customary land rights, this case study highlights 
the difficulty of operationalising community land ownership in Sudan. Unlike the Madhvani Group’s 
investment in Mangala, Green Resources' project is unquestionably located on community land, but the 
text of the investment agreement is somewhat ambiguous on the question of ownership. The preamble 
states that the CES government owns the land, but elsewhere in the agreement says the company will pay 
Tindilo community to use the land. This case study also shows how poor information flow between 
community representatives and the larger community can lead to misunderstandings and unfulfilled 
expectations. With the national elections of 2010, the government also encountered difficulties in keeping 
incoming office holders informed about investment activity in their areas. Finally, the Green Resources 
investment shows that community engagement alone may not be enough to safeguard local community 
interests, particularly in a legally ambiguous and highly fractured context. 
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On the Sudanese side, the CES Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and a local development committee 
mainly facilitated the agreement. The CES Ministry lead facilitation for the GoSS ministry, both of whom 
have officials on the board of directors and a close relationship with Green Resources. The CES Ministry 
also seconded a forester to work as plantation manager with the company. The forester is originally from 
Tindilo Community and therefore helped the company build a relationship with the community. The 
development committee (made up of Juba community members and chaired by a parliamentarian from 
the CES legislative assembly who came from Tindilo) was responsible for conveying information back and 
forth between the company and the community. Judging by how the negotiations proceeded, the 
development committee seemed to have considerable decision-making authority; as Tindilo paramount 
chief Sultan Romano Akob Fulo put it, ‘The people here [in Tindilo] are relying on their sons in Juba to 
follow up on things with the company.’ 
 
According to the TreeFarms plantation manager, the company undertook extensive consultation lasting 
more than a year, including: 
  three public consultations that took place in Tindilo Community between 2007 and 2009; 
supplemented by 
  traditional leadership structures of chiefs, sub-chiefs, elders, and clan headmen to pass 
information to and from the local level. 
The community initially hesitated to consent to the investment project due to suspicion of government 
proposed investment projects. To assuage these fears, company representatives assured the community 
that Green Resources was a private company and the CES government would only play a support role. The 
five Tindilo chieftainships, or bomas, identified unused portions of land to lease to Green Resources, so the 
company claims the project will displace no community members. 
 
Despite community involvement, elements of the investment agreement clearly benefit Green Resources. 
In exchange for the 99-year lease, Green Resources will pay £7 744 annual rent (CHRGJ 2010: 56), support 
agriculture and forestry and undertake several development projects such as drilling boreholes and 
building a primary school, health facilities and village office. However, the agreement does not clarify if the 
£7 744 rent will finance the development projects or if they are additional benefits provided by the 
company, although the community understood the agreement to mean they would manage development 
projects using rental payments. The investment agreement also obliges all able men and women in the 
community to volunteer two days of unpaid work a year to rehabilitate the road to Juba for the first five 
years of the project. The company must fulfil the above obligations for the first 25 years of investment; 
thereafter government will again take responsibility for infrastructure development. 
 
Green Resources also plans to establish a community-based forest management plan, intended to protect 
existing forest stocks and rehabilitate degraded forest areas. The company says it will plant indigenous 
fruit trees and high value hardwoods in degraded forest areas to enhance the nutritional safety net that 
the forest provides to the local community during poor harvests. It also plans to help community members 
establish alternative livelihood activities to replace incomes from charcoal production, initially focussing on 
Shea butter and gum Arabic enterprises. However, the investment agreement does not detail the 
arrangements. With the influx of returnees, population growth and increased demand on forest resources, 
there is no guarantee that enough land has been set aside to satisfy long-term population demands.   
 
Despite the apparent imbalance of benefits, the local community seems to support the investment. 
According the paramount chief, no one in the community opposes the investment project. The extent of 
the community's acceptance probably results from their fragile situation. Tindilo is in a remote rural area 
and is plagued by an alternating abundance and scarcity of water: in the rainy season, the road to Tindilo 
turns to mud and is virtually impassable by car; for several years, Green Resources has donated the use of 
its tractor to ferry supplies in and out of the community. In the dry season, water becomes extremely 
scarce and many community members rely on water deliveries from the county capital in Terekeka. 
Abnormally low rainfall in recent years resulted in high levels of hunger. The Country Manager of 
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TreeFarms Sudan (CHRGJ 2010: 57) explained that Tindilo is vulnerable because 'investors are not lining up 
to come to Tindilo. They [Tindilo] are forgotten by everyone…’  
 
However, the paramount chief complained that Green Resources had not yet delivered on any of its 
promises, which according to his understanding should have begun when Green Resources built a 
compound and began trial planting in Tindilo. This misunderstanding reflects the poor information flow 
between the development committee and the local community: most committee members live in Juba and 
only visit the community occasionally and there is no cell phone reception and only satellite phones for 
incoming calls. Therefore, the development committee was unable to keep community members properly 
informed about the details of the investment. The community did not even seem to understand basic facts 
about how carbon credit schemes operate, despite it being a fundamental aspect of the agreement. In 
addition to the poor information flow, April 2010 elections ousted the Terekeka County Commissioner and 
Tindilo payam's CES parliamentary representative, and neither official informed their successors about the 
lease agreement with Green Resources. So for their first six months in office the new officials had no 
details about the investment agreement.  
 
While the paramount chief claims the project is already creating jobs and delivering other help to the local 
community, the long-term impact is uncertain, given that the vague commitments in the investment 
agreement place risk squarely on the shoulders of the host community and increasing the likelihood of 
adverse impacts in future. Whether inequities in the agreement are traceable to particular positions taken 
by stakeholders or to difficulties operating in a fracture and legal ambiguous situation, the result is the 
same: unfulfilled expectations, unjustified risks to livelihoods, and seemingly unsustainable investment. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Preliminary data suggests that Southern Sudan is on the verge of a large increase in land acquisitions, 
although the future of such acquisitions depends on the political fallout from the 2011 referendum. If the 
country devolves into a state of war, all indications are that it will be a humanitarian disaster. Fuelled by oil 
wealth, the two sides have considerable military forces and war would mean massive loss of life and 
destruction, and generations more needed to rebuild. Although some investors, especially in extractive 
industries, might weather the difficult conditions to capitalise on South Sudan's natural resources, full-
scale war would effectively terminate most large-scale agricultural investments. But if peace is 
consolidated and the country moves forward with plans to develop the region, many land acquisitions 
currently being processed are likely to be quickly approved. A stable and independent south would likely 
attract much investor interest to its large, sparsely populated land and its wealth of natural resources.   
 
However, as currently conceived, large-scale land acquisitions in Southern Sudan risk further undermining 
livelihoods already sorely affected by conflict. Meaningful company–community engagement, in which 
host communities influence investment design and participate in on-going processes of shared decision-
making, are rare or nonexistent. Although poor community involvement contribute to investment 
agreements that strongly favour the investor, communities rarely withhold consent since the benefits 
promised by investor's are one of a few sources of development available to rural populations. When 
consent is withheld, it is usually a negotiating tactic designed to win small benefits, such as a school, a 
health centre, or a few boreholes, rather than a demand for sustained participation in the investment. 
Indications are that some deals may require mass population relocations, which would —even if 
compensated for their loss — set back individuals and families who are trying to rebuild their lives after the 
war. Officials and investors increase the risk by excluding communities from investment planning. 
 
The ambiguity of the prevailing Southern Sudanese law adds to the uncertainty. The Land Act, passed in 
2009, is a step in the right direction, but many of its protections are still out of reach for affected 
communities. When fully implemented, recognising customary land tenure and collectively registering 
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community lands would give communities a powerful bargaining chip when negotiating with investors and 
government. Provisions for impact assessments and community consultations could also help to formalise 
requirements and contribute to a more systematic and coherent approach to land acquisition. However, 
preliminary data suggests that community consultations and impact assessments are either non-existent or 
only ad hoc, thus violating the Land Act, affecting the allocation of benefits among the parties to the 
investment, and undermining efforts to set up a broad regulatory framework for land investments. 
 
In the absence of enforceable law, communities have turned to the ‘land belongs to the community’ 
concept to secure a more central position in decisions about community land use. Despite being excluded 
from decision-making while under the administration of the national government, in post-CPA Southern 
Sudan communities are beginning to expect and demand their inclusion in investment planning. Policy-
makers could strengthen such homegrown initiatives by exploring connections with existing conceptual 
frameworks like the 'free, prior and informed consent' (FPIC) standard applied to tribal and indigenous 
peoples’ rights under international law. While community demands for increased participation have not 
yet reached the level of a robust FPIC process, if communities consolidate their position, FPIC and other 
related standards can offer a way to operationalise community consent in large-scale land investments. 
 
To avoid potentially disastrous outcomes, the GoSS should consider limits on large-scale land acquisitions 
until government institutions have a chance to establish themselves. With independence of the South 
imminent, the GoSS has its hands full trying to maintain peace and resolve a long list of post-referendum 
issues. It does not have the time or resources to devote to timeously developing a responsible investment 
framework. Foreign and domestic investors have already secured millions of hectares of land with very 
little oversight. Government should explore several options open to it, for example: 
  pass regulations already called for in the Land Act to prescribe precise land ceilings for various 
levels of government.; or  
  announce a temporary moratorium on large-scale land acquisitions altogether, to give government 
institutions time to better situate themselves. 
Mobilising such actions requires political will, which is difficult given the public’s current orientation. 
Judging by official statements, many advocating for a ‘more is better’ approach to foreign investment. In 
the agriculture sector, this places emphasis on large-scale mechanised production and the large-scale land 
acquisitions this entails. Communities are also reluctant to oppose investment projects; due to extreme 
poverty and hunger, community leaders are sometimes willing to give away more land than they have, 
based only on vague and illusory promises from companies and government institutions. 
 
It is too early to assess impacts and predict how large-scale land investment will affect host populations in 
Southern Sudan. Communities are not yet feeling any tangible benefit or harm from land investments, and 
the issue of the ‘global land grab’ is not yet a common topic of conversation. If land deals currently under 
consideration move ahead as planned, public opposition to ‘land grabs’ could rise very quickly, which 
would have unpredictable effects on conflict dynamics in the region.   
 
It remains to be seen whether communities or the government will win in this battle for land. Most 
Southern Sudanese seem to accept the legitimacy of ‘land belongs to the community’, albeit with caveats 
about unreasonably withheld consent. If support for community land ownership continues to influence 
regional development, this might increasingly influence communities to wield more power and translate 
investment into increased benefits for rural populations. Even if communities gain a central role in 
managing land investments, FPIC becomes the legal standard, proposals from investors are carefully vetted 
for environmental and social impacts, and means are provided for local benefits, large-scale land 
acquisitions could still be one-sided deals in which a few ‘transnational elites’ benefit at the expense of 
local populations. The GoSS should take advantage of the brief opportunity in the wake of the referendum 
on self-determination, to consider how they will avoid such negative outcomes and harness the influx of 
foreign investment to enhance, rather than undermine, livelihoods in Southern Sudan. 
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